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1. Introduction
Competitive general equilibrium models with generational overlap exhibit the following
curious but well known behaviour when the time horizon is infinite: the competitive
mechanism need not lead to allocative efficiency, i.e. the first welfare theorem fails to
hold. As a consequence, these models provide a natural vehicle for the analysis of a
variety of macroeconomic questions all of which revolve around policy interventions that
can induce Pareto improvements over equilibrium allocations in a dynamic environment.
An easily stated and understood characterization of optimality is an essential tool in such
a task with ‘the net interest rate at a steady state of a deterministic economy is zero
or positive’ being a well known example. This paper shows that a corresponding simple
condition, in the form of whether the value of a single endogenously determined variable is
less than or equal to one, provides a characterization of optimality of stationary equilibria
in quite a general stochastic version of the overlapping generations model.
A rich literature investigates the failure of the first welfare theorem in overlapping
generations economies. Inspired by the seminal work of Cass (1972) on efficient growth,
Balasko and Shell (1980) and Okuno and Zilcha (1980) obtained a general result character-
izing those competitive equilibrium allocations which are also Pareto optimal allocations.
Since then, in developments paralleling those in general equilibrium analysis, the overlap-
ping generations model has been studied in successively more general frameworks with
risk, limited market participation, etc. The analysis of the optimality of equilibrium allo-
cations in stochastic environments has required appropriate specification of the markets
that agents have access to as well as the criterion of optimality. The natural specification
takes the demographic structure of the model seriously and assumes that agents cannot
participate in markets to insure against the risky endowment received when young but
can fully insure against risks faced when old, called sequentially complete markets in
later literature, with a corresponding notion of welfare that treats agents born in different
states as distinct entities; these two innovations had been introduced earlier by Muench
(1977) under the names spot markets and conditional Pareto optimality.
This paper considers a pure exchange economy with risky endowments that are real-
ized according to a stationary Markov process with a continuum of states, and provides
a characterization of the optimality of stationary competitive allocations in sequentially
complete markets using conditional Pareto optimality as the welfare criterion. It shows
that the ‘unit root property’, which asks whether the dominant eigenvalue of an operator
is less than or equal to one, is a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality. We
highlight the fact that the condition identified is easily stated and is transparently inter-
pretable. A key step in proving the result is to show that, associated with the dominant
eigenvalue, there exists an eigenvector that is measurable, uniformly positive, as well as
uniformly bounded. That ‘positive’ eigenvector plays an essential role in the analysis.
The result is obtained in the case where the Markov transition function is described by a
measurable density function that is uniformly positive and uniformly bounded.
Our approach is quite general since we allow the stationary equilibrium allocation to
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be any measurable function, while any stochastic process that obeys feasibility is allowed
to be a potential candidate for a Pareto improvement. The operator we study identi-
fies the prices of one period ahead Arrow securities induced at a stationary equilibrium;
equivalently, the operator specifies the marginal rates of substitution between consump-
tion when old and young in different states faced when old and young. We show that if the
dominant eigenvalue exceeds one then the associated positive eigenvector can be used to
construct an alternative stationary allocation that is a conditional Pareto improvement
over the stationary equilibrium allocation. We then use a second order approximation
approach and the positive eigenvector to show that any allocation that provides a con-
ditional Pareto improvement over a stationary equilibrium allocation necessarily induces
an inequality, with the weighted first moment of a bounded random variable on one side
and the weighted sum of of its second moment at earlier dates on the other; that single
inequality summarizes the value of additional resources required to fund the improvement.
The fact that the positive eigenvector is uniformly positive and uniformly bounded is then
used to argue that if the dominant eigenvalue of the operator is less than or equal to one
then the inequality is necessarily violated at some finite date.
The key step in our argument builds on Birkhoff (1957 and 1962) which treats the
eigenvalue-eigenvector problem for a class of linear operators on infinite dimensional
spaces.2 We show that when, as in our application, the kernel of the operator is uni-
formly positive and uniformly bounded, the eigenvector associated with the dominant
eigenvalue also is uniformly positive and uniformly bounded. Continuity of the operator
plays no role but, when assumed, delivers continuity of the eigenvector.3
Having stated what we do, we turn to discuss some aspects of our research question,
namely, our notion of optimality, our use of a continuum state space, and our use of a
model with one good.
The notion of optimality that we use to conduct the efficiency analysis is not the only
one available although we believe that it is the most appropriate one in our context (see
footnote 7 in Section 2.3). Weaker notions of optimality treat agents who are born in the
same state but face distinct states when old as different entities. Such ex post notions
of optimality run counter to the risk sharing opportunities provided by the markets that
we assume exist thus rendering their use in making welfare judgements difficult to justify.
The most obvious stronger notion does not distinguish between agents by the state of
birth and therefore makes welfare judgements based on allocations that agents cannot
access through the market. While such ex ante notions of optimality, which amount to
2The references to Birkhoff’s results in the literature in economic theory that we are aware of are all
to the finite dimensional case; footnote 11 in Section 3.1 lists some of them.
3The following could be another possible application: the results on the long-run risk-return rela-
tionship in Hansen and Scheinkman (2009) rest on the existence of a strictly positive eigenvector of the
pricing kernel, which is an operator, and their Assumpitions 9.1-4 suffice to ensure existence. The recent
work of Qin and Linetsky (2016) shows how Jentzsch’s theorem, a result that provides the motivation
and title for Birkhoff (1957), can be used to identify conditions that ensure the existence of a strictly
positive eigenvector in models that are particular cases of the one in Hansen and Scheinkman.
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providing insurance against the state in which an agent is born, have merit when they are
used to evaluate the impact of policy interventions, their use is unlikely to produce useful
indicators of the efficacy with which markets allocate resources.
Regarding our reasons for looking at a model with a continuum of states, we recall
that Lucas (1972) invoked the overlapping generations model to study an important issue
in macroeconomics. The context was one of risk and uncertainty and the model used
had a continuum of states. Muench (1977) closely followed Lucas (1972), also in using a
continuum state space. The move to analyzing finite state versions of the model appears
to have been the result of the technical complexities of dealing with a continuum state
space rather than any particular modelling preference grounded in economic analysis. An
example is the particular issue we face in defining our welfare notion, an issue that arizes
only because we have agents being born in one of a continuum of states at each date, and
this is discussed and resolved prior to the introduction of Definition 5 in Section 2.3. Also,
the fact that models of asset pricing in finance typically assume a continuum of states,
regardless of whether they consider an overlapping generations structure or one with an
infinitely lived agent, influences the choices made by researchers in the macro/finance
literature and provides additional reasons for analyzing such models.
The type of stationary equilibrium that we consider is described by functions defined
on the exogenous Markov state space. It is known from Spear (1985) that when there
is more than one good at each date, such stationary equilibria do not exist in general.
This is why we consider one good economies. For general pure exchange economies with
uncertainty described by a tree with a uniformly bounded number of successor nodes to
each node and many goods at each node, and with markets that are sequentially complete,
Citanna and Siconolfi (2010) show the generic existence of stationary equilibria described
by functions on an enlarged endogenous Markov state space. As noted below, the situation
is similar when stochastic versions of the Diamond model are considered. Obtaining a ‘unit
root’-type characterization result for the optimality properties of stationary equilibrium
allocations in such economies is the subject of ongoing research. However, the kernel of
the operator is no longer uniformly positive, and need not be described by a density either;
evidently, the more general environment requires a nontrivial extension of the analysis of
the eigenvector problem presented here. That provides a more methodological reason for
pursuing the research presented here.
To place our paper in context we relate it to two early contributions to the literature on
optimality in stochastic overlapping generations economies: Manuelli (1990) considered a
model very similar to the one treated in this paper, while Aiyagari and Peled (1991) looked
at the case of a finite number of states but also allowed risky linear technologies. Both
used a first order approximation approach. Manuelli provided a necessary and sufficient
condition for optimality in the form of the existence of a function that satisfies a set
of inequalities, one for each state.4 Aiyagari and Peled (1991) identified the unit root
4Demange and Laroque (1999, 2000) and Barbie and Kaul (2015) note that some parts of the proof
in Manuelli (1990) are unclear.
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property by appealing to Perron’s theorem on positive matrices. Importantly, Aiyagari
and Peled (1991) restricted attention to the class of stationary allocations so that arbitrary
feasible allocations were not admissible as possible Pareto improvements; later work by
Demange and Laroque (1999), Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999), and Chattopadhyay
(2001) showed that the unit root result holds even when nonstationary allocations are
considered. The result in the present paper shows that the unit root property characterizes
optimality in the much more general framework with a continuum of states.
This paper also relates to Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) who consider general
pure exchange economies with two period lifetimes, uncertainty described by a tree with
a uniformly bounded number of successor nodes to each node, and many goods at each
node, and with markets that are sequentially complete; they provide a characterization of
those competitive allocations that are conditionally Pareto optimal. Their result is a gen-
eralized Cass criterion and they show how their result can be used to obtain the unit root
property when attention is restricted to stationary equilibria with finite support. Barbie,
Kaul, and Hagedorn (2007) extend the general characterization result in Chattopadhyay
and Gottardi (1999) to one good economies with bounded neoclassical technologies. As
noted earlier, and expanded upon below, stationary equilibria with finite support do not
generally exist in such production economies.
Although we have confined our discussion to the case of exchange economies, there
is an equally rich literature on optimality in stochastic overlapping generations models
with production. Zilcha (1991) provides an early characterization result for a criterion
of optimality that is weaker than conditional Pareto optimality.5 Demange and Laroque
(2000) extend their analysis of the pure exchange model with stochastic linear technologies
and demographic shocks in Demange and Laroque (1999) to a neoclassical technology. In
doing so the state space for capital becomes endogenous and, although they restrict atten-
tion to stationary allocations on a compact state space that are described by continuous
functions that are uniformly positive, they are unable to obtain a characterization result.
Barbie and Hillebrand (2017) extend the recursive approach (developed in Barbie and
Kaul (2015) for pure exchange economies) to production economies to analyze stationary
allocations that are continuous and uniformly positive on an endogenous state space and
obtain conditions that are similar in spirit to the conditions in Manuelli (1990) but fall
short of a characterization result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, namely,
the notation relating to the probabilistic structure, agents and their characteristics, and
aggregates, and the definitions of optimality, markets and agents’ behaviour in markets,
and stationary equilibrium. Section 3 introduces Birkhoff’s work, presents the result that
we need, and casts that result in terms of our model. Section 4 states our theorem and
provides a number of remarks including a detailed technical discussion of the relevant
literature. Many proofs are collected in Section 5.
5Similarly, Bloise and Calciano (2008) consider a pure exchange environment that is very similar to
the one in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999), and provide a result for a weaker notion of optimality.
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2.1 Model: Temporal and Stochastic Structure
The economy evolves in discrete time with exogenous states drawn from a temporal
state space, denoted S below. The probability of transition from one temporal state to
another is described by a stationary Markov kernel, denoted Q below. We consider the
case where the transition is induced by a family of density functions, denoted π below.
We turn to a formal development.
Bn is the Borel σ-algebra on Rn. Λn denotes n-dimensional Lebesgue measure.
S is the temporal state space.
Assumption 1 (i): S ∈ Bn. S is a compact set with Λn(S) > 0.
S is the restriction of Bn to S. Define ΛS on (S,S) by ΛS(F ) := Λn(F )
Λn(S)
for F ∈ S.
t = 1, 2, · · · .
One defines Ω := S∞, with typical element ω which is a sequence. The projection
function st : Ω→ S identifies the t-th coordinate of the sequence ω. We use the notation
ωt := st(ω) and ω
t := (ω1, ω2, · · · , ωt). Ft := σ (s1, s2, · · · , st) is the σ-algebra generated
by the collection of functions (s1, s2, · · · , st). F is a σ-algebra such that F = σ (∪∞t=1Ft).
Definition 1: A transition density function on S is an element of
D := {p : S2 → R+|p is S2 −measurable and for all s ∈ S,
∫
S
p(s, s′)ΛS(ds′) = 1}.
p ∈ D induces Qp, a stationary Markov transition on the measurable space (S,S). µ
is a probability measure on (S,S); it describes the probability with which the initial state
is chosen. µ and Qp induce Qp,t, a probability measure on (St,St) for each t = {2, 3, · · · };
Qp,1 := µ. By Kolmogorov’s Extension Theorem, there exists a unique probability mea-
sure P p on (Ω,F) which is consistent with all the measures Qp,t, where t = {1, 2, · · · }:
KET for F ∈ St P p({ω|ωt ∈ F}) = Qp,t(F ).
Assumption 1 (ii): π ∈ D is such that for all (s, s′) ∈ S2, 0 < π ≤ π(s, s′) ≤ π <∞.
(Ω,F , P π) is our probability triple; {Ft}∞t=1 is the filtration that we will use.
For F ∈ F , IF : Ω→ {0, 1} is the indicator function, IF (ω) = 1 if and only if ω ∈ F .
Given ω and t, define At(ω) := {ω˜ ∈ Ω|ω˜t = ωt}, i.e. those sample points that, up to
date t, share the same history as ω. At(ω) ∈ Ft and is a cylinder. Define
A := {A ∈ ∪t≥1Ft|A = At(ω) for some ω ∈ Ω and some t = 1, 2, · · · },
a distinguished set of cylinders. If A ∈ A then there exists a unique t(A) such that for all
ω ∈ A, we have At(A)(ω) = A and At(A)+1(ω) 6= A. So elements of A play the same role
as date-events in an environment where the state space is finite.
That completes the description of the risky environment.
We introduce two sets of measurable functions. For (X,X ) a measurable space, define
BX,X := {f : X → R|f is X -measurable and supx∈X |f(x)| <∞},
BX,X+ := B
X,X ∩ {f : X → R|f(x) ≥ 0}.
6
Elements of BA,Ft(A) are constant functions and can be identified with their values.
Let s = 1, 2, · · · . For f ∈ BΩ,Ft+s and p ∈ D, EP p [f |Ft](ω) denotes the conditional
expectation of f given Ft where the integration is with respect to the measure P p. We
recall the defining property as well as two other properties of conditional expectations:
CE for G ∈ Ft
∫
G
EP p [f |Ft](ω)P p(dω) =
∫
G
f(ω)P p(dω),
CE (i) EP p [EP p [f |Ft+s]|Ft](ω) = EP p [f |Ft](ω) and
CE (ii) if g ∈ BΩ,Ft then EP p [f · g|Ft](ω) = g(ω) · EP p [f |Ft](ω).
When there is no scope for confusion, we write E[f |Ft](ω) instead of EPpi [f |Ft](ω).
For t ∈ {1, 2, · · · } and F ∈ Ft+1,
CP P π(F |ωt) := EPpi [IF |Ft] =
∫
{s′∈st+1(At(ω)∩F )}
π(st(ω), s
′)ΛS(ds′);
it is the probability, conditional on the σ-algebra Ft, of the occurrance of the event F .
2.2 Model: Agents
We turn to a description of the physical environment.
There is a single good at each A ∈ A, i.e at date t(A) and every ω ∈ A.
Set H := {1, · · · , H}. H agents are born at each A ∈ A and live for two periods.
They are denoted (A, h) ∈ A ×H. Also, H “initial old” agents denoted (A, h, o), where
A ∈ A is such that t(A) = 1, enter the economy at t = 1 and live for only one period.
The consumption set of each agent is XA,h = B
A,Ft(A)
+ × BA,Ft(A)+1+ . For the initial old
agent we have XA,h,o = B
A,Ft(A)
+ .
We assume that the economy is stationary in that the agents’ endowments and pref-
erences depend on history only through the realization of the Markov state at the date
at which the agent is born. Given A ∈ A and ω ∈ A, the projection function allows us
to identify st(A)(ω) as the Markov state of interest to us. Since to each A ∈ A one can
assign a unique t(A), we write sA in place of st(A)(ω).
For endowments we use the notation e(A, h) and require e(A, h) ∈ XA,h; for the initial
old we use e2,1(A, h, o) ∈ XA,h,o. Stationarity requires: for arbitrary pairs A and A˜, and
(ω, ω˜) ∈ A × A˜, if sA = sA˜ and st(A)+1(ω) = st(A˜)+1(ω˜) then e(ω;A, h) = e(ω˜; A˜, h). So
consider e : S ×H → R+ × BS,S+ with the interpretation that, for s′ ∈ S, e(s, h) induces
(e1(s, h), e2(s
′; s, h)) ∈ R2+. Set e(ω;A, h) := (e1(sA, h), e2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)) where ω ∈ A.
In addition, we assume that, for some s˜ ∈ S, e2,1(ω;A, h, o) = e2(sA; s˜, h) for ω ∈ A, for
all (A, h) ∈ A × H where t(A) = 1. This ensures that the stochastic endowment of the
initial old agents is compatible with the stationary structure of the economy.
Preferences have a subjective expected utility representation. Each agent has a state
dependent Bernoulli function that depends on (i) the identity of the agent only through
nature’s choice at the date of the agent’s birth and (ii) the state faced in the second
period of life only through nature’s choice when the agent is old. The function is denoted
u(·; sA, h) : R2+ × S → R; for the initial old agent we use u(z; sA, h, o). The functions u
are assumed to satisfy standard conditions formally specified in Assumption 2 below. For
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(A, h) and ω ∈ A, the agent’s preferences over (x1,t(A), x2,t(A)+1) ∈ XA,h are assumed to
be representable in the form
V (x1,t(A), x2,t(A)+1;A, h) :=
∫
A
u(x1,t(A)(ω), x2,t(A)+1(ω), st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)P
π(dω|ωt(A)).
Assumption 2: (i) H is finite.
(ii) For all (A, h) ∈ A×H with t(A) = 1, XA,h,o = BA,Ft(A)+ and u(·; sA, h, o) : R+ → R
where u(z; sA, h, o) is strictly increasing in z for every sA ∈ S.
(iii) For all (A, h) ∈ A × H, XA,h = BA,Ft(A)+ × BA,Ft(A)+1+ , for ω ∈ A, e(ω;A, h) =
(e1(sA, h), e2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)) where e : S × H → R+ × BS,S+ is S−measurable, and
u(·; sA, h) : R2+ × S → R where u(y, z, s′; sA, h) is
(a) S-measurable in both sA and s′,
(b) for every s′ ∈ S, it is twice continuously differentiable for (y, z) ∈ R2++ and
differentiably strictly concave in (y, z), and strictly increasing in y and z, and
(c) for all (x1,t(A), x2,t(A)+1) ∈ XA,h, V (x1,t(A), x2,t(A)+1;A, h) is well defined.
(iv) For some s˜ ∈ S, e2,1(ω;A, h, o) = e2(sA; s˜, h) for ω ∈ A, for all (A, h) ∈ A × H
with t(A) = 1.
2.3 Model: Aggregates and Optimality
We introduce the notation that allows us to undertake welfare comparisons. The terms
are all standard and adapted to the environment of the model.
Definition 2: An allocation x is {x1,t,h, x2,t,h}∞t=1, with xi,t ∈ BΩ,Ft+ for i = 1, 2, for all
t = 1, 2, · · · , and for h = 1, · · · , H, a pair of stochastic processes adapted to the filtration.
Definition 3: The aggregate endowment is the function e : S × S → R+
e(s, s′) :=
H∑
h=1
[e1(s
′, h) + e2(s
′; s, h)] .
The next assumption imposes restrictions on the aggregate endowment. It amounts to
requiring that a minimal (strictly positive) consumption level is always achieveable for the
2H agents who coexist; there is also a maximal level of consumption which is independent
of the economy’s history.
Assumption 3: The aggregate endowment is measurable, uniformly positive and uni-
formly bounded:
1. e : S × S → R+ is S × S-measurable,
2. there exist e > 0 and e <∞ such that
e ≤ e(st−1(ω), st(ω)) ≤ e for all t = 1, 2, · · · , and for all ω.6
6Here and elsewhere we do not add the qualification “a.s.”
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Recall that s˜ was specified in Assumption 2 (iv).
Definition 4: A feasible allocation is an allocation that satisfies the restriction
H∑
h=1
[x1,t,h(ω) + x2,t,h(ω)] ≤ e(st−1(ω), st(ω)) for all t = 1, 2, · · · , and for all ω,
where s0(ω) := s˜ for all ω ∈ Ω.
Let (A, h)’s consumption plan be denoted x(A, h) = (x1,t(A),h, x2,t(A)+1,h) ∈ XA,h. For
the initial old agent (A, h, o) we use the notation x2,1,h ∈ BA,Ft(A)+ . For ω ∈ A, x(A, h)
induces x(ω;A, h) = (x1,t(A),h(ω), x2,t(A)+1,h(ω)) ∈ R2+. Evidently, we can work inter-
changeably with an allocation or a set of consumption plans, one for each agent.
We use the Pareto criterion to make welfare judgements. We follow Muench (1977)
who extends the Pareto criterion to environments in which agents are distinguished by
the state in which they are born.7 In our framework of Markovian uncertainty with a
continuum of states, requiring the set of agents who are strictly improved to be a set of
positive measure translates into the requirement that the allocation strictly improves a
positive measure subset of the initial old agents; this seems to go against the grain of
the overlapping generations model. Instead, 2a and 2b in Definition 5 capture the idea
that a Pareto improving allocation must strictly improve all those agents who are born
in some set of positive conditional measure; since an agent is a pair in A×H, the formal
requirement is that the conditional expected utility of at least one “date-event” contingent
agent is strictly higher. As Remark 2 in Section 4 notes, since we restrict attention to
equilibrium allocations that are stationary, if a CPO improvement as per Definition 5
exists then in fact agents in a set of positive measure can be improved.
Definition 5: A feasible allocation x := {x1,t,h, x2,t,h}∞t=1 is Conditionally Pareto Optimal
(CPO) if there does not exist another feasible allocation xˆ := {xˆ1,t,h, xˆ2,t,h}∞t=1 such that
1a. for all (A, h) ∈ A×H with t(A) = 1,
u(xˆ2,1,h(ω); sA, h, o) ≥ u(x2,1,h(ω); sA, h, o) for ω ∈ A,
1b. for all (A, h) ∈ A×H,
V (xˆ1,t(A),h, xˆ2,t(A)+1,h;A, h) ≥ V (x1,t(A),h, x2,t(A)+1,h;A, h),
2a. either for some (A′, h′) ∈ A×H with t(A′) = 1,
u(xˆ2,1,h′(ω); sA′ , h
′, o) > u(x2,1,h′(ω); sA′ , h
′, o) for ω ∈ A′,
2b. or for some (A′, h′) ∈ A×H,
V (xˆ1,t(A′),h′ , xˆ2,t(A′)+1,h′ ;A
′, h′) > V (x1,t(A′),h′ , x2,t(A′)+1,h′ ;A
′, h′).
7This is a well established approach to the assessment of welfare in models with generational overlap,
e.g. see Peled (1982), Manuelli (1990), Aiyagari and Peled (1991), Demange and Laroque (1999), Chat-
topadhyay and Gottardi (1999), Demange and Laroque (2000), Chattopadhyay (2001), Barbie, Hagedorn,
and Kaul (2007), and Barbie and Kaul (2015). Zilcha (1991) proposes a different definition.
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2.4 Model: Demand and Intertemporal Prices
A complete set of Arrow securities is available at each F ∈ A. So markets are sequen-
tially complete.
Asset prices are given by {qt}∞t=1 where, for each t, qt : Ω → R+ is Ft-measurable.
The interpretation is that, for F ∈ Ft+1,
∫
F
qt+1(ω)P
π(dω|ωt) is the price paid at t in any
(and every) state ω˜ ∈ At(ω) for one unit of the Arrow security which pays one unit of the
good at t+ 1 if and only if F occurs.
We write a single budget constraint using the prices of the Arrow securities; the fact
that markets are sequentially complete allows us to do this.
The optimization problem solved by (A, h) is to
max(x1,t(A),x2,t(A)+1)∈XA,h
∫
A
u(x1,t(A)(ω), x2,t(A)+1(ω), st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)P
π(dω|ωt(A))
subject to [x1,t(A)(ω)− e1(sA, h)]+
+
∫
A
qt(A)+1(ω)[x2,t(A)+1(ω)−e2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)]P π(dω|ωt(A)) ≤ 0 for ω ∈ A.
Since the utility function is strictly increasing, the constraint holds with equality. At
an interior solution (x̂1,t(A),h, x̂2,t(A)+1,h), the first order conditions imply that
8
qt(A)+1(ω) =
u2(x̂1,t(A),h(ω), x̂2,t(A)+1,h(ω), st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)∫
A
u1(x̂1,t(A),h(ω), x̂2,t(A)+1,h(ω), st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)P π(dω|ωt(A)) .
Definition 6: An allocation x is stationary if for all (A, A˜) ∈ A×A and all (ω, ω˜) ∈ A×A˜,
sA = sA˜ and st(A)+1(ω) = st(A˜)+1(ω˜) ⇒ x(ω;A, h) = x(ω˜; A˜, h).
So consider a function x : S×H → R+×BS,S+ with the interpretation that, for s′ ∈ S,
x(s, h) induces (x1(s, h), x2(s
′; s, h)) ∈ R2+. Set x(ω;A, h) := (x1(sA, h), x2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)),
where ω ∈ A, to generate the stationary allocation x from the function x.
To reduce the notational burden, for i = 1, 2, we define
ux,s,hi (s
′) := ui(x1(s, h), x2(s
′; s, h), s′; s, h) (s, s′) ∈ S2.
Consider stationary asset prices given by the function q : S×S → R+. So qt(A)+1(ω) =
q(sA, st(A)+1(ω)). With stationary asset prices, at the interior stationary allocation x̂, the
first order conditions take the form
q(sA, st(A)+1(ω)) =
ux̂,sA,h2 (st(A)+1(ω))∫
S
ux̂,sA,h1 (st(A)+1)π(sA, st(A)+1)Λ
S(dst(A)+1)
,
since, by CP of Section 2.1, P π(F |ωt) = ∫
{s′∈st+1(At(ω)∩F )}
π(st(ω), s
′)ΛS(ds′) for F ∈ Ft+1.
8We use ui, i ∈ {1, 2}, to denote the first order partial derivatives of u with respect to its first two
coordinates.
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We have shown that qx̂ satisfies
qx̂(s, s′) =
ux̂,s,h2 (s
′)∫
S
ux̂,s,h1 (s
′)π(s, s′)ΛS(ds′)
.
2.5 Model: Stationary Equilibrium
We can now formally introduce the notion of a stationary equilibrium.
Definition 7: (x∗, q∗), where x∗ : S × H → R+ × BS,S+ , so that it induces x∗, an
allocation that is stationary, and q∗ : S×S → R+, is a stationary competitive equilibrium
with sequentially complete markets if the allocation induced is feasible and
1. for all (A, h) ∈ A×H, for ω ∈ A, [x∗1(sA, h)− e1(sA, h)]+
+
∫
A
q∗(sA, st(A)+1(ω))[x
∗
2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)− e2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)]P π(dω|ωt(A)) ≤ 0,
2. if (x1,t(A), x2,t(A)+1) ∈ XA,h is such that
V (x1,t(A), x2,t(A)+1;A, h) >
∫
A
u(x∗1(sA, h), x
∗
2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h), st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)P
π(dω|ωt(A))
then, for ω ∈ A,
[x1,t(A)(ω)−e1(sA, h)]+
∫
A
q∗(sA, st(A)+1(ω))[x2,t(A)+1(ω)−e2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h)]P π(dω|ωt(A)) > 0.
In order to be able to make any meaningful progress, we must work with an equilibrium
process that has the minimal property of being measurable. Rather than verifying that
our assumptions ensure that the stationary asset pricing function q∗ is measurable, we
directly assume this property.
Assumption 4: q∗ is S × S-measurable.
q∗ · π : S × S → R+ defined as q∗ · π(s, s′) := q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′) is the pricing kernel
associated with a stationary equilibrium.
3.1 Birkhoff’s Generalization of the Perron-Frobenius Theorem
The result that we present in this section generalizes Perron’s Theorem on the existence
of a strictly positive eigenvector of a strictly positive matrix to a class of linear operators;
we build on Birkhoff (1957, 1962), henceforth B ’57 and B ’62, respectively.9 The key idea
is to introduce the notion of a distance in which the linear operator is a strict contraction
on a set which is complete.10 We are unaware of a standard treatment that develops in
9B ’57 treats the problem in the framework of vector lattices, while B ’62 generalizes even further.
10Eveson (1995) provides a nice entry to the literature.
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detail the specific result we need; therefore, we have opted to introduce the concepts and
the results with references to B ’57 and B ’62.11
Recall that for (X,X ) a measurable space,
BX,X = {f : X → R|f is X -measurable and supx∈X |f(x)| <∞}.
We follow B ’57 (Example 3 on page 221) and define CM for M ≥ 1 by
CM := BX,X ∩ {f : X → R | 0 < sup f(x) ≤M inf f(x)}.
CM is a convex cone. Let 0 be the function that is identically zero, and define CM0 :=
CM∪{0}. CM0 induces the partly ordered vector space (BX,X , CM0 ) where the partial order,
≧, is defined by the rule: f ≧ g if and only if (f − g) ∈ CM0 .12
In B ’62, the function θ : CM0 × CM0 → [0,∞] is defined as
θ(f, g) :=

∞ if {α ∈ R|αf ≧ g} = ∅ or {β ∈ R|βg ≧ f} = ∅,
ln(αf,gβf,g) if αf,g <∞ where αf,g := inf{α ∈ R|αf ≧ g}
and βf,g <∞ where βf,g := inf{β ∈ R|βg ≧ f}.
We have g ≦ αf,gf ≦ αf,gβf,gg and f ≦ βf,gg ≦ αf,gβf,gf . θ(·) is Hilbert’s projective
quasi-metric on CM0 ;
13 it is not a metric since θ(f, g) = 0 if and only if f and g are on
the same ray of CM . Lemma 8 in B ’62 shows that (CM , θ(·)) is a quasi-metric space
in which the equivalence classes of vectors that are a zero distance apart are the rays of
CM . Furthermore, subsets of CM with the property that θ(f, g) < ∞ form connected
components.
So θ(·) is a metric on the set of rays in the same connected component of CM .
The following key property is simply noted as a fact in B ’57 (5. Applications, page
222). We provide a proof based on B ’57, B ’62, and Zabreiko et al (1972).
Lemma 1: Each connected component of CM is complete in θ(·).
The proof of Lemma 1 appears in Section 5.1.
Birkhoff considers a bounded linear operator that leaves invariant the cone which
induces the partly ordered vector space, and introduces the following condition: the
image of the cone under the operator has “finite diameter” in the quasi-metric θ(·). He
shows that such a bounded linear operator is uniformly contracting in the quasi-metric
θ(·), and hence there is a unique ray in the cone that is invariant.
11There are references to B ’57 in the literature in economic theory but those applications are to the
products of finite dimensional matrices. Kohlberg and Pratt (1982), which is largely restricted to the
finite dimensional case, provides both a presentation of Birkhoff’s approach and the result, as well as
a discussion of applications together with references. Montrucchio (1998) uses a related result due to
Thompson (1963) to study the differentiability of the policy function in dynamic programming problems.
12B ’57 and B ’62 consider pairs (X,C) where X is a vector space and C is a positive cone of elements.
13B ’57 uses θ(f, g;C) and “projective metric associated with C” for the case of the pair (X,C).
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Proposition 1: Let p : X ×X → R be X × X−measurable, and let it satisfy
0 < p = inf p(x, y) ≤ sup p(x, y) = κp for κ > 0,
and let (X,X , µ) be a measure space with 0 < µ(X) < ∞. Then there exists f ∗ ∈ CM ,
unique up to the ray it lies on, for M ≥ κ such that, for some φ > 0,∫
X
p(x, y)f ∗(y)µ(dy) = φ · f ∗(x) ∀ x ∈ X.
Proof: Consider the linear operator P : BX,X → BX,X defined by
[fP ](x) =
∫
X
p(x, y)f(y)µ(dy).
Clearly, P is bounded. For f ∈ CM , set If :=
∫
X
f(y)µ(dy). We have If > 0.
We show that P maps the space CM into itself. Since If > 0 for f ∈ CM , we have
inf [fP ](x) ≥ pIf > 0 and sup [fP ](x) ≤ κpIf .
For M ≥ κ we have
M inf [fP ](x) ≥MpIf ≥ κpIf
so that
M inf [fP ](x) ≥ sup [fP ](x) ≥ inf [fP ](x) > 0,
and it follows that
[fP ] ∈ CM .
Consider e ∈ BX,X+ such that e(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X; e ∈ CM . For f ∈ CM we have
(pIf )e ≦ fP ≦ (κpIf )e
so that, since κ ≤M ,
(pIf )e ≦ fP ≦ (κpIf )e ≦ (MpIf )e,
and, by linearity,
e ≦
f
pIf
P ≦Me,
and so αe, f
pIf
P ≤M and βe, f
pIf
P ≤ 1. It follows that θ(e, fpIf P ) ≤ lnM .
Since θ(f, g) = 0 if and only if f and g are on the same ray of CM , we have θ(e, fP ) =
θ(e, f
pIf
P ). Therefore we have θ(e, fP ) ≤ lnM . By the triangle inequality
θ(fP, gP ) ≤ θ(e, fP ) + θ(e, gP ) ≤ 2lnM.
This shows that, in terms of the projective quasi-metric, the distance between pairs of
images is uniformly bounded. By Lemma 1 in Section 4 in B ’57 (or by the Corollary to
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Theorem 3 on pg 48 in B ’62) the operator P is a strict contraction in θ(·). By Lemma
1 above, each connected component of rays of CM is complete in θ(·). From Theorem 1
in B ’57 it follows that there is a unique characteristic ray f ∗ ∈ CM such that, for some
φ > 0, [f ∗P ] = φf ∗. The result follows when we observe that
[f ∗P ] = φf ∗ ⇔
∫
X
p(x, y)f ∗(y)µ(dy) = φ · f ∗(x) ∀ x ∈ X.
Remark 1: B ’57 also allows us to obtain a result where the eigenvector is also continuous.
Let X be a topological space. Instead of the space of bounded measurable functions, one
considers the space of continuous and bounded functions with the sup norm, together
with the cone of continuous functions in CM . The result follows by strengthening the
hypotheses on the function p to continuity, and observing that Lemma 1 continues to
hold for the smaller cone of functions.
3.2 Stationary Equilibrium Allocations and Positive Eigenvectors
Proposition 1 allows us to show that to any stationary equilibrium allocation one can
associate a strictly positive eigenvector and a corresponding eigenvalue that must be a
positive real number. Evidently, we need to ensure that the pricing kernel associated with
a stationary equilibrium satisfies uniform upper and lower bounds.
Definition 8: A stationary allocation x is uniformly interior if there exists ε > 0 such
that for all (A, h) ∈ A×H, x1(sA, h) ≥ ε, and x2(s′; sA, h) ≥ ε ∀ s′ ∈ S.
Lemma 2: Let (x∗, q∗) be a stationary competitive equilibrium with sequentially complete
markets in which the equilibrium allocation is uniformly interior. Under Assumptions
1-4, there exists γ∗ ∈ BS,S and φ > 0 such that∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)γ∗(s′)ΛS(ds′) = φ · γ∗(s) ∀ s ∈ S
and γ∗ > 0 and γ∗ <∞, where γ∗ := infSγ∗(s) and γ∗ := supSγ∗(s).
The proof of Lemma 2 appears in Section 5.2.
4. The Unit Root Result: a Characterization of Optimality
We turn to the main result of the paper. We provide a characterization of the optimal-
ity properties of stationary competitive equilibria when markets are sequentially complete
in terms of the magnitude of the eigenvalue identified in Lemma 2.
It is well known that curvature inequalities which provide quadratic approximations
to an agent’s utility play essential roles in the characterization results on optimality of
competitive paths in OLG economies. Since fleshing them out is notationally laborious,
we relegate the detailed development to Section 5.3 (see Lemma C). Here we state two
independent curvature assumptions which require the existence of uniform lower and upper
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bounds on the ratio of the quadratic form obtained from the matrix of second derivatives
of the Bernoulli function u to the value of first derivative of u with respect to its first
coordinate. The notation is indicative and Section 5.3 has the details.
Assumption C (ii): ρx˜ := 1
2
infω∈ΩD
x˜
2(ω)
supω∈ΩD
x˜
1(ω)
> 0, C (iii): ρx˜ := 1
2
supω∈ΩD
x˜
2(ω)
infω∈ΩD
x˜
1(ω)
<∞.
Remark C in Section 5.3 notes that if the Bernoulli function is independent of the
state when young and when old, then Assumptions 2-3 together with the requirement
that the equilibrium allocation is uniformly interior, ensure that Assumptions C (ii) and
C (iii) are satisfied (the same is true if the state space has a finite number of elements).
The interior stationary equilibrium is said to satisfy the unit root property if the eigen-
value φ is less than or equal to one.
Theorem 1: Let (x∗, q∗) be a stationary competitive equilibrium with sequentially com-
plete markets in which the equilibrium allocation is uniformly interior. Under Assump-
tions 1-4 and C (ii) and C (iii), the equilibrium allocation is CPO if and only if it satisfies
the unit root property.
Proof: Lemma C in Section 5.3 applies since Assumption 3 and uniform interiority of
the equilibrium allocation imply that Assumption C (i), also in Section 5.3, holds.
First we show that there exists a stationary improvement when φ exceeds one.14
We apply Lemma C (i) in Section 5.3 which provides sufficient conditions, including
a curvature inequality, under which there is a local perturbation of the equilibrium con-
sumption plan that gives strictly higher utility than the equilibrium consumption plan.
We now show that when φ exceeds one, the inequality in Lemma C (i) holds.
From Lemma 2, the pair (φ, γ∗) is such that∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)γ∗(s′)ΛS(ds′) = φ · γ∗(s) ∀ s ∈ S
⇔
∫
S
ux
∗,s,h
2 (s
′)∫
S
ux
∗,s,h
1 (s
′)π(s, s′)ds′
· π(s, s′)γ∗(s′)ΛS(ds′)− γ∗(s) ≥ (φ− 1)γ∗ > 0 ∀ s ∈ S.
Recalling CP of Section 2.1, and identifying γ∗(s) as the transfer received in state s by
some (arbitrary) agent type h when old and also the transfer made in state s by the same
type h when young, we see that Lemma C (i) indeed applies with δ = (φ− 1)γ∗.
By choosing ǫ > 0 to be sufficiently small and by reducing the consumption of an
agent born in state s by ǫ · γ∗(s) and increasing it by ǫ · γ∗(s′) in each state when old,
one generates a strict Pareto improvement. Aggregate feasibility is obviously maintained;
since the equilibrium allocation is uniformly interior, by choosing ǫ to be sufficiently
small we can ensure that perturbed consumption when young is strictly positive. As the
14A first order condition argument appears in Aiyagari and Peled (1991), Demange and Laroque (1999),
and Chattopadhyay (2001). The approach here is based on a second order approximation similar to the
one in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999).
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transfers proposed are from the young to the old, the initial old are improved in every
state. That completes the proof of Theorem 1 in one direction.
Now we proceed to an argument by contradiction to show that if the unit root property
holds then there can be no improvements, stationary or otherwise.
Suppose that there exists an allocation xˆ that CPO dominates x∗. Define
∆1,t(A),h(ω) := xˆ1,t(A),h(ω)− x∗1(sA, h), for ω ∈ A where (A, h) ∈ A×H,
∆2,t(A)+1,h(ω) := xˆ2,t(A)+1,h(ω)−x∗2(st(A)+1(ω); sA, h), for ω ∈ A where (A, h) ∈ A×H,
where the notation allows us to treat the case in which the allocation xˆ is not stationary.
We apply Lemma C (ii) in Section 5.3 which identifies a curvature inequality that
must hold if a local perturbation of a consumption plan gives higher utility than the
equilibrium consumption plan. Lemma C (ii) requires the perturbed plan to be interior;
since preferences are convex, this can be achieved by taking a convex combination of the
equilibrium plan (which is uniformly interior) and the perturbed plan. We assume that
this has been done.
By Lemma C (ii) we have, for all agents (A, h) ∈ A×H,∫
ω∈A
q∗
(
st(A) (ω) , st(A)+1 (ω)
)
∆2,t(A)+1,h (ω)P
π
(
dω|ωt(A)) ≥ −∆1,t(A),h (ω)+ρ[∆1,t(A),h (ω)]2,
(1)
where ρ := ρx
∗
and x∗ is the stationary allocation induced by x∗.
Define
∆¯t(A)(ω) := − 1
H
∑
h∈H
∆1,t(A),h(ω), for ω ∈ A where A ∈ A,
the negative of the change in the average consumption by the young born at A.
Feasibility of the alternative allocation implies that
1
H
∑
h∈H
∆2,t(A)+1,h(ω)− ∆¯t(A)+1(ω) ≤ 0, for ω ∈ A.
It follows that if the first term is positive then so is the second. Clearly, the fact that the
initial old must also be improved implies that ∆¯1(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
By averaging the inequality in (1) across the set of agents born at A, using Jensen’s
inequality applied to a quadratic function, and using the feasibility condition, we obtain:∫
ω∈A
q∗
(
st(A) (ω) , st(A)+1 (ω)
)
∆¯t(A)+1 (ω)P
π
(
dω|ωt(A)) ≥ ∆¯t(A) (ω) + ρ[∆¯t(A) (ω)]2. (2)
Next, we use Lemma 2 to rewrite (2). We use the pair (φ, γ∗) identified in Lemma 2 to
induce v : S×S → R+ by setting υ(s, s′) := q∗(s,s′)·γ∗(s′)φγ∗(s) . It is easy to check that υ is S×S-
measurable, uniformly positive and uniformly bounded, and
∫
s′∈S
υ(s, s′)·π(s, s′)ΛS(ds′) =
1 for all s ∈ S; in particular, υ · π is a transition density function. We have∫
ω∈A
q∗
(
st(A) (ω) , st(A)+1 (ω)
)
∆¯t(A)+1 (ω)P
π
(
dω|ωt(A)) =
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= φ·γ∗ (st(A) (ω)) ∫
ω∈A
q∗
(
st(A) (ω) , st(A)+1 (ω)
) · γ∗ (st(A)+1 (ω))
φγ∗
(
st(A) (ω)
) · ∆¯t(A)+1 (ω)
γ∗
(
st(A)+1 (ω)
)P π (dω|ωt(A))
= φ · γ∗ (st(A) (ω)) ∫
ω∈A
υ
(
st(A) (ω) , st(A)+1 (ω)
) · ∆¯t(A)+1 (ω)
γ∗
(
st(A)+1 (ω)
)P π (dω|ωt(A))
= φ · γ∗ (st(A) (ω))E
[
υ
(
st(A), st(A)+1
) · ∆¯t(A)+1
γ∗
(
st(A)+1
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft(A)
]
(ω) .
Since At(ω) ∈ A is well defined for given ω and t, (2) can now be rewritten as
φ · E
[
υ(st, st+1) · ∆¯t+1
γ∗(st+1)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(ω) ≥ ∆¯t(ω)
γ∗(st(ω))
+ ρ
[∆¯t(ω)]
2
γ∗(st(ω))
. (3)
The existence of an improving allocation implies that (3) must hold.
As noted earlier, ∆¯1(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. This fact together with an application of
(3) shows that there must be some date t¯ such that the change in average consumption
by the young is zero for all agents born at dates t < t¯, while some of those that are old
at t¯ are improved; so ∆¯t¯(ω) > 0 for ω ∈ E where P π(E|ωt¯−1) > 0 and E ∈ Ft¯, i.e. a set
of positive conditional measure. So the right hand side of (3) is positive on E for t = t¯.
Inductively define Υt+1(ω) := Υt(ω) · υ(st(ω), st+1(ω)) with Υ1(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω.
By iterating forwards the stochastic difference inequality (3) we obtain
Lemma 3: Under A.1 and A.2, for T = 1, 2, · · · and ω ∈ E,
φT ·E
[
Υt¯+T · ∆¯t¯+T
γ∗(st¯+T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ Υt¯(ω)· ∆¯t¯(ω)
γ∗(st¯(ω))
+ρ
{
T−1∑
τ=0
φτ ·E
[
Υt¯+τ · [∆¯t¯+τ ]
2
γ∗(st¯+τ )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
}
> 0.
Next we note two implications of the fact that υ · π is a transition density function;
the implication in (b) follows from Jensen’s Inequality.
Lemma 4: For any t¯ ≥ 1, any T = 1, 2, · · · , and any f ∈ BΩ,Ft¯+T ,
(a) E [Υt¯+T · f |Ft¯] (ω) = Υt¯(ω) · EPυ·pi [f |Ft¯] (ω),
(b) E [Υt¯+T · f |Ft¯] (ω) ≥ a > 0 ⇒ Υt¯(ω) · E
[
Υt¯+T · [f ]2 |Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ a2.
The proofs of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 appear in Section 5.2.
By Assumption 3, the endowment is uniformly bounded and, by Lemma 2, γ∗ > 0, so
feasibility implies that ∆¯t(ω)
γ∗(st(ω))
is always bounded. When we ignore all but the first term
on the right hand side, the expression in the statement of Lemma 3 becomes
E
[
Υt¯+T · ∆¯t¯+T
γ∗(st¯+T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ Υt¯(ω)
φT
· ∆¯t¯(ω)
γ∗(st¯(ω))
for all T = 1, 2, · · · ,
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so an application of Lemma 4 (b) shows that
Υt¯(ω) · E
[
Υt¯+T · [∆¯t¯+T ]
2
[γ∗(st¯+T )]2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ [Υt¯(ω)]
2
φ2T
· [∆¯t¯(ω)]
2
[γ∗(st¯(ω))]2
for all T = 1, 2, · · · ,
⇒ φT · E
[
Υt¯+T · [∆¯t¯+T ]
2
γ∗(st¯+T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ γ
∗
γ∗
· Υt¯(ω)
φT
· [∆¯t¯(ω)]
2
γ∗(st¯(ω))
for all T = 1, 2, · · · ,
where, by Lemma 2, γ∗ > 0 and γ∗ < ∞. It follows that the right hand side of the
inequality in Lemma 3 is bounded below by
Υt¯(ω) · ∆¯t¯(ω)
γ∗(st¯(ω))
{
1 + ρ · γ
∗
γ∗
· ∆¯t¯(ω)
T∑
τ=0
1
φτ
}
> 0,
an expression that diverges if and only if φ ≤ 1. By Lemma 4 (a), the left hand side
of the inequality in Lemma 3 is Υt¯(ω) · EPυ·pi
[
∆¯t¯+T
γ∗(st¯+T )
|Ft¯
]
(ω), a constant multiplied by
the conditional expected value of a bounded variable, multiplied by the growth factor φT .
Clearly, if φ ≤ 1, the left hand side is uniformly bounded above and so there exists a T
for which the inequality in Lemma 3 is violated. This yields the desired contradiction
confirming that no such set E ∈ Ft¯ with P π(E|ωt¯−1) > 0 can exist when φ ≤ 1.
Remark 2: Evidently, the proof of Theorem 1 is simple in that it does not rely on the
existence of random variables defined through limits.
Also, when φ > 1 we perturb the consumption plan of every agent, including the initial
old, of type h where h ∈ Hˆ ⊂ H and Hˆ 6= ∅. So a subset of the set of all agents of “size
at least 1/H” is strictly improved. Conversely, the existence of any CPO improvement
implies that φ > 1. We can conclude that the stationarity of both the model and the
equilibrium allocation ensure that the characterization result for CPO optimality remains
unchanged even if the requirement to be an improvement is tightened from “some agent”
to “a set of agents of positive measure.”
Remark 3: By Remark 1, Proposition 1 generalizes to the case in which p is a continuous
and bounded function. Assume that q∗ is continuous, and strengthen Assumption 1 (ii)
so that π is continuous. It follows that Lemma 2 generalizes to the case in which q∗ · π
is continuous and bounded, with the conclusion that γ∗ is uniformly positive, uniformly
bounded, and continuous. Although Theorem 1 remains unchanged, now if φ > 1 there
exists an improving transfer which is a continuous function; conversely, if a CPO improve-
ment exists then φ > 1 and there must exist a stationary and continuous improvement.
Remark 4: In the finite state case, an argument that uses only first order terms easily
shows that if there exists a stationary allocation that is a CPO improvement, then φ > 1
(see, e.g. Chattopadhyay (2001)). We now show that an analogous result can be proved
with a continuum of states if q∗ · π is known to be continuous.
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By Remark 3, Lemma 2 generalizes to that case with the conclusion that γ∗ is uni-
formly positive, uniformly bounded, and continuous.
Suppose there is a stationary improvement, i.e., a function ξ where ξ(s) is the transfer
received in state s by an agent when old, where ξ is measurable, bounded, and upper
semi-continuous. Since the initial old must also be improved, ξ must be nonnegative.
Also, ∫
S
ux
∗,s,h
2 (s
′) · π(s, s′)ξ(s′)ΛS(ds′) > ξ(s)
∫
S
ux
∗,s,h
1 (s
′)π(s, s′)ΛS(ds′) ∀ s ∈ S,
since every agent is improved (here we require a strict inequality—in this way we can
ignore third and higher order terms while the strict inequality takes into account the
second order term since it has a negative effect). Equivalently,∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)ξ(s′)ΛS(ds′) > ξ(s) ∀ s ∈ S
⇔ φ
∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)γ∗(s′)
φγ∗(s)
ξ(s′)
γ∗(s′)
ΛS(ds′) >
ξ(s)
γ∗(s)
∀ s ∈ S
where we use the fact, stated in Lemma 2, that γ∗ := infSγ
∗(s) > 0.
Let s¯ ∈ S denote a state in which
ξ(s¯)
γ∗(s¯)
≥ ξ(s)
γ∗(s)
for all s ∈ S.
Continuity of γ∗ and compactness of S, together with the facts that γ∗ := infSγ
∗(s) > 0
and that ξ is upper semi-continuous, ensure that s¯ exists.
So the existence of a stationary improvement ξ that is upper semi-continuous implies
that
φ
∫
S
q∗(s¯, s′) · π(s¯, s′)γ∗(s′)
φγ∗(s¯)
ξ(s′)
γ∗(s′)
ΛS(ds′) >
ξ(s¯)
γ∗(s¯)
and
ξ(s¯)
γ∗(s¯)
≥ ξ(s)
γ∗(s)
∀ s ∈ S.
Since ∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)γ∗(s′)ΛS(ds′) = φ · γ∗(s) ∀ s ∈ S
it follows that
ξ(s¯)
γ∗(s¯)
≥
∫
S
q∗(s¯, s′) · π(s¯, s′)γ∗(s′)
φγ∗(s¯)
ξ(s′)
γ∗(s′)
ΛS(ds′).
But then, the existence of such a ξ that is upper semi-continuous implies that φ > 1.
Notice that measurability of ξ does not suffice to guarantee the existence of the state
s¯. Yet, the proof of Theorem 1 is able to handle the case where an improving allocation
has no regularity properties beyond being a stochastic process.
Remark 5: We are now in a position to relate our result to the literature. That an
eigenvalue completely characterizes optimality of stationary allocations can be seen as
follows: restate Lemma 2 in the form∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)γ∗(s′)ΛS(ds′)− γ∗(s) = (φ− 1)γ∗(s) ∀ s ∈ S, (∗)
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where γ∗ is measurable, uniformly positive, and uniformly bounded. Evidently, φ > 1 if
and only if the left hand side of (∗) is uniformly positive. By Lemma C (i), a rescaled γ∗
generates a CPO improvement if the left hand side of (∗) is uniformly positive; conversely,
using Lemma C (ii), the existence of a CPO improvement can be shown to be incompatible
with φ ≤ 1, i.e. then φ > 1. By the latter, if φ ≤ 1 then the allocation is CPO.
The model in Manuelli (1990) is identical to ours except that he works with a general
Markov transition function on a compact subset of a metric space.15 The result in Manuelli
is: for a stationary allocation to be CPO it is necessary and sufficient that there is a
measurable function ξ that is uniformly positive and uniformly bounded such that∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)ξ(s′)ΛS(ds′)− ξ(s) ≤ 0 ∀ s ∈ S. (M)
With Lemma 2 in hand, Manuelli’s condition can be written in terms of (∗) as φ ≤ 1; in
the absence of Lemma 2 one cannot make that connection. This observation underlines
the difficulty in using a condition in terms of the existence of a function that satisfies a set
of inequalities since it is less informative, particularly when it comes to the negation of the
condition. Also, (∗) is a tighter condition when φ 6= 1 and this difference can be traced
to the fact that our proof uses a second order approximation which is more informative
than the first order approach followed by Manuelli.
Demange and Laroque (2000) consider a model similar to ours with production, a finite
number of exogenous states and a continuum of endogenous states for capital. Whether
Theorem 1 can be extended to their framework is an open question. They consider strictly
positive continuous stationary allocations on a compact state space. They show that ξ
that is uniformly positive and continuous generates a CPO improvement if the left hand
side of (∗) is strictly positive; instead, if (M) holds then the allocation is CPO. As they
recognize, their result is not a characterization. They go further by studying the spectral
value but are unable to close the gap completely.
Barbie and Kaul (2015) consider a model that is almost identical to ours except that
their state space S is a compact Polish space. For stationary allocations that are contin-
uous and Markov transition functions that satisfy a strong form of continuity, they show
that: ξ that is strictly positive and continuous generates a CPO improvement if the left
hand side of (∗) is strictly positive; instead, if there exists a CPO improvement then there
exists a ξ that is strictly positive and continuous for which the left hand side of (∗) is
strictly positive (with a weaker assumption on the Markov transition functions, a weaker
version of the latter result is obtained as ξ is measurable but might fail to be continuous).
This agrees exactly with the result noted in Remark 3 and corresponds to φ > 1 in terms
of our result. Of course, (∗) delivers a better bound, Theorem 1 applies even when q∗ · π
fails to be continuous, and a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of a single number
is manifestly simpler.
15He assumes that the transition satisfies the Feller condition but it is not clear that this is used in the
result on optimality. We have many agent types but that makes no difference to the result.
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5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1: Each connected component of CM is complete in θ(·).
Proof: Let {fn} be a sequence in a connected component of CM . Assume that {fn}
is Cauchy with respect to θ(·), i.e. for every ǫ > 0 there exists N(ǫ) such that, for all
m,n ≥ N(ǫ), θ(fm, fn) = ln(αm,nβm,n) < ǫ; equivalently, for all m,n ≥ N(ǫ), αm,nβm,n <
eǫ. Choose a subsequence {fn(k)} such that θ(fn(k), fn(k+1)) < −ln
(
1− 1
ak
)
, where a > 1.
From the definition of θ(·) we know that
fn(k) ≦ βn(k),n(k+1)fn(k+1) ≦ αn(k),n(k+1)βn(k),n(k+1)fn(k).
Furthermore, αn(k),n(k+1)βn(k),n(k+1) <
(
1− 1
ak
)−1
since θ(fn(k), fn(k+1)) < −ln
(
1− 1
ak
)
.
So
fn(k) ≦ βn(k),n(k+1)fn(k+1) ≦
(
1− 1
ak
)−1
fn(k).
Set
h1 :=
(
1− 1
a
)
fn(1) and for k ≥ 2, hk :=
(
k−1∏
i=1
[(
1− 1
ai
)
βn(i),n(i+1)
])
fn(k).
Clearly, for each i, hi lies on the same ray as fn(i), so θ(fn(i), hi) = 0. In addition, it is
easy to check that the sequence {hk} is such that
(
1− 1
ak
)
hk ≦ hk+1 ≦ hk. Therefore,
by iterating on the two inequalities one obtains, for all k > 1,
∏k−1
i=1
(
1− 1
ai
)
h1 ≦ hk and
hk ≦ h1, while rewriting the first inequality leads to hk − hk+1 ≦ 1akhk.
We shall show that (i) δh1 ≦ hk ≦ h1, where δ :=
[
ea/(a−1)
2
]−1
, and (ii) for k > j ≥ 1,
0 ≦ hj − hk ≦ δjh1 where δj := a1−ja−1 ≥ 1aj aa−1
[
1− 1
ak−j
]
.
We have
k−1∑
i=j
1
ai
=
1
aj
(
k−1−j∑
i=0
1
ai
)
=
1
aj
a
a− 1
[
1− 1
ak−j
]
.
Since 1 + x < ex for x > 0, from the above we also have
k−1∏
i=j
(
1 +
a
a− 1
1
ai
)
= e
∑k−1
i=j ln(1+ aa−1
1
ai
) < e
∑k−1
i=j
a
a−1
1
ai = e
a
a−1
1
aj
a
a−1 [1−
1
ak−j
];
in particular,
∏k−1
i=1
(
1 + a
a−1
1
ai
)
< e
a
a−1
1
a
a
a−1 [1−
1
ak−1
] < e
a
(a−1)2 .
Since a > 1 we have
(
1− 1
ai
) (
1 + a
a−1
1
ai
) ≥ 1, and therefore, as in the proof of Theorem
4 on page 220 in Knopp (1990), we may conclude that
k−1∏
i=1
(
1− 1
ai
)
≥
[
k−1∏
i=1
(
1 +
a
(a− 1)ai
)]−1
>
[
e
a
(a−1)2
]−1
.
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That completes the proof of (i). The proof of (ii) follows from (i) and the fact that
hj − hk =
k−1∑
i=j
(hi − hi+1) ≦
k−1∑
i=j
1
ai
hi.
By (ii), there exists zj,k ∈ CM0 such that hj − hk + zj,k = δjh1, so that, for k > j ≥ 1,
‖ hj − hk ‖∞≤‖ hj − hk ‖∞ + ‖ zj,k ‖∞=‖ hj − hk + zj,k ‖∞= δj ‖ h1 ‖∞,
where the first equality follows from the fact that zj,k ∈ CM0 and that, for f ∈ BX,X ,
‖ f ‖∞:= supx∈X |f(x)|. It follows that {hk} is a Cauchy sequence in (CM0 , ‖ · ‖∞). Since
(BX,X , ‖ · ‖∞) is a Banach space, and CM0 is a closed subset of (BX,X , ‖ · ‖∞), (CM0 , ‖ · ‖∞)
is complete. So there is h ∈ CM0 such that ‖ hk − h ‖∞→ 0 as k →∞.
Since 0 ≦ hj − hk ≦ δjh1 for k > j ≥ 1, and ‖ hk − h ‖∞→ 0 as k →∞, we have
0 ≦ hj − h ≦ δjh1 ⇔ 0 ≦ hj − h ≦ δj(δ)−1hk,
where we use (i) to get from the first to the second pair of inequalities. We can now use
the fact that ‖ hk − h ‖∞→ 0 as k →∞ to obtain
h ≦ hj ≦
(
1 + δj(δ)
−1
)
h ⇔ θ(hj, h) = ln
(
1 + δj(δ)
−1
)
and so, recalling that δj :=
a1−j
a−1
, we may conclude that θ(hj, h)→ 0 as j →∞. As
θ(fm, h) ≤ θ(fm, fn(k)) + θ(fn(k), hk) + θ(hk, h),
where θ(fn(k), hk) = 0 since, by construction, the two vectors lie on the same ray, and
θ(fm, fn(k))→ 0 since {fm} is a Cauchy sequence with respect to θ(·), we have θ(fm, h)→
0 as m→∞. Since θ(fm, h) <∞, we can conclude that h is an element of the connected
component that contains {fm}. We have shown that every sequence in a connected
component of CM which is Cauchy with respect to θ(·) has a subsequence with a limit in
the same connected component; this implies that every such Cauchy sequence has a limit
in the same connected component. That completes the proof.
5.2 Proofs of Lemma 2, 3, and 4
Lemma 2: Let (x∗, q∗) be a stationary competitive equilibrium with sequentially complete
markets in which the equilibrium allocation is uniformly interior. Under Assumptions
1-4, there exists γ∗ ∈ BS,S and φ > 0 such that∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)γ∗(s′)ΛS(ds′) = φ · γ∗(s) ∀ s ∈ S
and γ∗ > 0 and γ∗ <∞, where γ∗ := infSγ∗(s) and γ∗ := supSγ∗(s).
Proof: Since the aggregate endowment is uniformly bounded and H < ∞, x∗ must be
uniformly bounded. By assumption x∗ is uniformly interior. With our assumption that
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the Bernoulli utility functions u are all strictly increasing and continuously differentiable,
the function q∗ is uniformly positive and uniformly bounded, i.e., there exist q and q such
that
0 < q = inf(s,s′)∈S×Sq
∗(s, s′) ≤ sup(s,s′)∈S×Sq∗(s, s′) = q.
Now consider the function q∗ · π. It is S × S−measurable and by what we have just seen
and Assumption 1, there exist q and π such that, for some κ > 0,
0 < qπ ≤ inf(s,s′)∈S×Sq∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′) ≤ sup(s,s′)∈S×Sq∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′) ≤ κ · qπ.
It follows from Proposition 1 in Section 3 that there exists an eigenvector
γ∗ ∈ BS,S ∩ {f : S → R | 0 < sup f(x) ≤M inf f(x)},
where M ≥ κ, so γ∗ is measurable, uniformly positive and bounded, such that, for some
φ > 0, an eigenvalue,∫
S
q∗(s, s′) · π(s, s′)γ∗(s′)ΛS(ds′) = φ · γ∗(s) ∀ s ∈ S.
Define γ∗ := infSγ
∗(s) and γ∗ := supSγ
∗(s). Evidently, γ∗ > 0 and γ∗ <∞.
Lemma 3: Under A.1 and A.2, for T = 1, 2, · · · and ω ∈ E
φT ·E
[
Υt¯+T · ∆¯t¯+T
γ∗(st¯+T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ Υt¯(ω)· ∆¯t¯(ω)
γ∗(st¯(ω))
+ρ
{
T−1∑
τ=0
φτ ·E
[
Υt¯+τ · [∆¯t¯+τ ]
2
γ∗(st¯+τ )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
}
> 0.
Proof: When we defined υ we noted that it is uniformly positive and uniformly bounded.
By CE (i) and CE (ii) of Section 2.1, we have
φT · E
[
Υt¯+T · ∆¯t¯+T
γ∗(st¯+T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω) =
= Υt¯(ω) · φ · E
[
υ(st¯, st¯+1) · · ·
{
φ · E
[
υ(st¯+T−1, st¯+T ) · ∆¯t¯+T
γ∗(st¯+T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯+T−1
]}
· · ·
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω),
so that for ω ∈ E, upon using (3), we have
≥ Υt¯(ω)·φ·E
[
υ(st¯, st¯+1) · · ·φ·E
[
υ(st¯+T−2, st¯+T−1)
{
∆¯t¯+T−1
γ∗(st¯+T−1)
+ρ
[∆¯t¯+T−1]
2
γ∗(st¯+T−1)
}∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯+T−2
]
· · ·
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
= Υt¯(ω) · φ ·E
[
υ(st¯, st¯+1) · · ·
{
φ ·E
[
υ(st¯+T−2, st¯+T−1)
∆¯t¯+T−1
γ∗(st¯+T−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯+T−2
]}
· · ·
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)+
+Υt¯(ω) · φ · E
[
υ(st¯, st¯+1) · · ·φ · E
[
υ(st¯+T−2, st¯+T−1)ρ
[∆¯t¯+T−1]
2
γ∗(st¯+T−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯+T−2
]
· · ·
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
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so that, upon using (3) again in the first term and using CE (ii) in the second term, we
obtain
≥ Υt¯(ω)·φ·E
[
υ(st¯, st¯+1) · · ·φ·E
[
υ(st¯+T−3, st¯+T−2)
{
∆¯t¯+T−2
γ∗(st¯+T−2)
+ρ
[∆¯t¯+T−2]
2
γ∗(st¯+T−2)
}∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯+T−3
]
· · ·
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)+
+ρ · φT−1 · E
[
Υt¯+T−1
[∆¯t¯+T−1]
2
γ∗(st¯+T−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
= Υt¯(ω) · φ ·E
[
υ(st¯, st¯+1) · · ·
{
φ ·E
[
υ(st¯+T−3, st¯+T−2)
∆¯t¯+T−2
γ∗(st¯+T−2)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯+T−3
]}
· · ·
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)+
+Υt¯(ω) · φ · E
[
υ(st¯, st¯+1) · · ·φ · E
[
υ(st¯+T−3, st¯+T−2)ρ
[∆¯t¯+T−2]
2
γ∗(st¯+T−2)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯+T−3
]
· · ·
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
+ρ · φT−1 · E
[
Υt¯+T−1
[∆¯t¯+T−1]
2
γ∗(st¯+T−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
= Υt¯(ω) · φ ·E
[
υ(st¯, st¯+1) · · ·
{
φ ·E
[
υ(st¯+T−3, st¯+T−2)
∆¯t¯+T−2
γ∗(st¯+T−2)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯+T−3
]}
· · ·
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)+
+ρ · φT−2 · E
[
Υt¯+T−2
[∆¯t¯+T−2]
2
γ∗(st¯+T−2)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω) + ρ · φT−1 · E
[
Υt¯+T−1
[∆¯t¯+T−1]
2
γ∗(st¯+T−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
· · ·
≥ Υt¯(ω) · ∆¯t¯(ω)
γ∗(st¯(ω))
+ ρ
{
T−1∑
τ=0
φτ · E
[
Υt¯+τ
[∆¯t¯+τ ]
2
γ∗(st¯+τ )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft¯
]
(ω)
}
.
Lemma 4: For any t¯ ≥ 1, any T = 1, 2, · · · , and any f ∈ BΩ,Ft¯+T ,
(a) E [Υt¯+T · f |Ft¯] (ω) = Υt¯(ω) · EPυ·pi [f |Ft¯] (ω),
(b) E [Υt¯+T · f |Ft¯] (ω) ≥ a > 0 ⇒ Υt¯(ω) · E
[
Υt¯+T · [f ]2 |Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ a2.
Proof: Let t ∈ {1, 2, · · · } and consider any set Bt such that Bt := B1× · · · ×Bt where,
for s ∈ {1, · · · , t}, Bs ⊂ S; Bt ∈ St and is a measurable rectangle. Any transition density
p ∈ D, together with the measure µ on (S,S), induces the measure Qp,t on (St,St) where
(i) Qp,t
(
Bt
)
=
∫
B1
· · ·
∫
Bt
Qp(st−1, dst) · · ·Qp(s1, ds2) · µ(ds1)
=
∫
B1
[∫
B2
· · ·
[∫
Bt
p(st−1, st)Λ
S(dst)
]
· · · p(s1, s2)ΛS(ds2)
]
· µ(ds1),
where the last equality follows since the stationary transition Qp is induced by p ∈ D,
and, by KET in Section 2.1,
(ii) P p
(
Bt ×
∏
τ>t
S
)
= Qp,t
(
Bt
)
.
Since Υt(ω) := υ(s1(ω), s2(ω)) · · · υ(st−1(ω), st(ω)), and π ∈ D, we have
(iii)
∫
Bt×
∏
τ>t S
Υt(ω)P
π(dω) :=
∫
Bt×
∏
τ>t S
υ(s1(ω), s2(ω)) · · · υ(st−1(ω), st(ω))P π(dω).
Recall that υ is uniformly positive, uniformly bounded, and
∫
s′∈S
υ(s, s′)·π(s, s′)ΛS(ds′) =
1 for all s ∈ S. It follows that υ ·π is a transition density function, υ ·π ∈ D. Now consider
the probability measure P υ·π. Since (i) and (ii) above hold for all p ∈ D we have
P υ·π
(
Bt×
∏
τ>t
S
)
=
∫
B1
[∫
B2
· · ·
[∫
Bt
υ(st−1, st)·π(st−1, st)ΛS(dst)
]
· · · υ(s1, s2)·π(s1, s2)ΛS(ds2)
]
·µ(ds1
=
∫
B1
[∫
B2
· · ·
[∫
Bt
υ(s1, s2) · · · υ(st−1, st)·π(st−1, st)ΛS(dst)
]
· · · π(s1, s2)ΛS(ds2)
]
·µ(ds1).
But then, using (iii), it follows that, for any F ∈ Ft,∫
F
Υt(ω)P
π(dω) =
∫
F
P υ·π(dω).
Since υ is uniformly positive and uniformly bounded, the definition of Υt lets us conclude
that Υt ∈ BΩ,Ft+ . Evidently, for F ∈ Ft,
P π|Ft(F ) = 0 ⇒ P υ·π|Ft(F ) = 0,
where the measures P π|Ft and P υ·π|Ft are the restrictions of the measures P π and P υ·π, re-
spectively, to the measurable space (Ω,Ft). It follows from the Radon-Nikodym Theorem
that
Υt =
dP υ·π|Ft
dP π|Ft
.
By Theorem 2 on page 79 in Gikhman and Skorokhod, for F ∈ Ft and any f ∈ BΩ,Ft ,∫
F
f(ω)P υ·π|Ft(dω) =
∫
F
f(ω)Υt(ω)P
π|Ft(dω).
Now consider any t¯ ≥ 1, any T = 1, 2, · · · , and any f ∈ BΩ,Ft¯+T . For G ∈ Ft¯, we can
use, in order, CE, the last result with t = t¯ + T , CE again, Υt¯+T =
dPυ·pi |Ft¯+T
dPpi |Ft¯+T
, CE once
again, and CE (ii) together with Ft¯-measurability of EPυ·pi |Ft¯+T [f |Ft¯] (ω), to write∫
G
EPpi |Ft¯+T [Υt¯+T · f |Ft¯] (ω)P
π|Ft¯+T (dω) =
∫
G
f(ω)Υt¯+T (ω)P
π|Ft¯+T (dω) =
∫
G
f(ω)P υ·π|Ft¯+T (dω)
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=∫
G
EPυ·pi |Ft¯+T [f |Ft¯] (ω)P
υ·π|Ft¯+T (dω) =
∫
G
Υt¯+T (ω)EPυ·pi |Ft¯+T [f |Ft¯] (ω)P
π|Ft¯+T (dω)
=
∫
G
EPpi |Ft¯+T
[(
Υt¯+TEPυ·pi |Ft¯+T [f |Ft¯]
)
|Ft¯
]
(ω)P π|Ft¯+T (dω)
=
∫
G
EPυ·pi |Ft¯+T [f |Ft¯] (ω) · EPpi |Ft¯+T [Υt¯+T |Ft¯] (ω)P
π|Ft¯+T (dω)
which suggests the following implication in terms of conditional expectations16
EPpi |Ft¯+T [Υt¯+T · f |Ft¯] (ω) = EPpi |Ft¯+T [Υt¯+T |Ft¯] (ω) · EPυ·pi |Ft¯+T [f |Ft¯] (ω).
The last line may be rewritten as
EPpi [Υt¯+T · f |Ft¯] (ω) = EPpi [Υt¯+T |Ft¯] (ω) · EPυ·pi [f |Ft¯] (ω)
since, for any probability measure, in particular for the measure induced by any transition
density function p ∈ D, the fact that f is Ft¯+T -measurable implies that
EP p|Ft¯+T [f |Ft¯] (ω) = EP p [f |Ft¯] (ω).
Therefore, to complete the proof of Lemma 4 (a) it suffices to show that
EPpi [Υt¯+T |Ft¯] (ω) = Υt¯(ω).
By CE (i), it suffices to show that EPpi [Υt¯+T+1|Ft¯+T ] (ω) = Υt¯+T (ω). Using the fact
that Υt(ω) := υ(s1(ω), s2(ω)) · · · υ(st−1(ω), st(ω)) and CE (ii), we have
EPpi [Υt¯+T+1|Ft¯+T ] (ω) = EPpi [Υt¯+T · υ(st¯+T , st¯+T+1)|Ft¯+T ] (ω)
= Υt¯+T (ω) · EPpi [υ(st¯+T , st¯+T+1)|Ft¯+T ] (ω)
= Υt¯+T (ω) ·
∫
{s′∈st¯+T+1(At¯+T (ω))}
υ(st¯+T (ω), s
′) · π(st¯+T (ω), s′)ΛS(ds′),
where we use CP,
= Υt¯+T (ω),
since st¯+T+1(At¯+T (ω)) = S, and
∫
s′∈S
υ(s, s′) · π(s, s′)ΛS(ds′) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
That completes the proof of Lemma 4 (a).
We turn to the proof of Lemma 4 (b). By the conditional form of Jensen’s Inequality,
EPυ·pi [Υt¯ · f |Ft¯] (ω) ≥ a > 0 ⇒ EPυ·pi
[
[Υt¯]
2 · [f ]2 |Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ a2.
Upon using CE (ii) on the terms on the left hand side of each of the inequalities above
we obtain
Υt¯(ω) · EPυ·pi [f |Ft¯] (ω) ≥ a > 0 ⇒ [Υt¯(ω)]2 · EPυ·pi
[
[f ]2 |Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ a2,
so that by applying Lemma 3 (a) to the terms on the left hand side of each of the
inequalities above we obtain
E [Υt¯+T · f |Ft¯] (ω) ≥ a > 0 ⇒ Υt¯(ω) · E
[
Υt¯+T · [f ]2 |Ft¯
]
(ω) ≥ a2
as required.
16For a general statement see, e.g. Lemma 4.29 in Kopp, Malczak, and Zastawniak (2013).
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5.3 Statement and Proof of Lemma C
In this section we present a result in two parts: (i) we specify conditions on parameters
under which if a consumption plan and a local perturbation of that plan jointly satisfy a
certain inequality, then the perturbed plan induces higher utility than the unperturbed
one, and (ii) we specify another set of conditions on parameters under which if a local
perturbation of a consumption plan induces higher utility than the unperturbed plan
then a certain inequality must hold. As we noted in Section 4, it is well known that such
curvature inequalities, which provide quadratic approximations to an agent’s utility, play
essential roles in the characterization results on optimality of competitive paths in OLG
economies; fleshing them out is notationally laborious and the conditions can be phrased
in different ways. We present one consistent way of setting things up and note that we
have sacrificed some generality in the interest of brevity.17
We start with some notation and preliminary definitions.
Recall that an agent (A, h)’s consumption plan is denoted x(A, h) ∈ XA,h, with
x(A, h) =
(
x1,t(A),h, x2,t(A)+1,h
)
. From here on, for an agent (A, h)’s consumption plan
x(A, h) ∈ XA,h, and ω ∈ A, we use the notation xA,h(ω) :=
(
x1,t(A),h (ω) , x2,t(A)+1,h (ω)
)
.
To reduce the notational burden, we define
ux,A,h (ω) := u
(
xA,h (ω) , st(A)+1 (ω) ; sA, h
)
.
Recall that u is a twice differentiable function. Let ui, i ∈ {1, 2}, denote the first order
partial derivatives of u with respect to its first two coordinates, and let D2u denote the
matrix of partial derivatives of order two.
We extend the notation to first and second derivatives for xA,h (ω) ∈ R2++, e.g.
ux,A,hi (ω) := ui
(
xA,h (ω) , st(A)+1 (ω) ; sA, h
)
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Although the economy depends on ω in a very general way, the existence of derivatives
can be ensured if all plans x(A, h) ∈ XA,h are such that, for all ω ∈ A, xA,h (ω) ∈ R2++.
So let x˜ := {x˜1,t,h, x˜2,t,h}∞t=1 be a feasible allocation which induces consumption plans
x˜(A, h) for all (A, h) ∈ A × H and for all initial old agents (A, h, o). Recall that, by
Assumption 3, e is a uniform upper bound on the aggregate endowment. Define XeA,h :=
B
A,Ft(A)
e × B
A,Ft(A)+1
e where B
A,Ft(A)+i
e = {f : A→ (0, e]} ∩ BA,Ft(A)+i for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Assumption C (i): x˜ is such that x˜(A, h) ∈ XeA,h for all (A, h) ∈ A×H.
Consider xˆ(A, h) ∈ XeA,h and x˜(A, h) ∈ XeA,h, and define ∆x(A, h) := xˆ(A, h)−x˜(A, h).
It follows that, for ω ∈ A, we have
∆x1,t(A),h (ω) := xˆ1,t(A),h (ω)− x˜1,t(A),h (ω) ,
17See Demange and Laroque (1999, 2000), Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999), Barbie, Hagedorn, and
Kaul (2007), and Barbie and Kaul (2015); we draw on all of the above.
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∆x2,t(A)+1,h (ω) := xˆ2,t(A)+1,h (ω)− x˜2,t(A)+1,h (ω) ,
∆xt(A),h (ω) :=
(
∆x1,t(A),h (ω) ,∆x2,t(A)+1,h (ω)
) ∈ R2.
For ǫ ∈ [0, 1], we extend the notation ux˜,A,h (ω) by defining
ux˜,ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω) := u
(
x˜A,h (ω) + ǫ ·∆xt(A),h (ω) , st(A)+1 (ω) ; sA, h
)
.
Using a second order Taylor expansion, for some τ ∈ [0, 1] we must have
V (x˜ (A, h) + ǫ ·∆x(A, h);A, h)−V (x˜ (A, h) ;A, h) =
∫
A
[
ux˜,ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω)− ux˜,A,h (ω)]P π (dω|ωt(A))
=
∫
A
{
ux˜,A,h1 (ω) · ǫ ·∆x1,t(A),h (ω) + ux˜,A,h2 (ω) · ǫ ·∆x2,t(A)+1,h (ω)
+
[
1
2
· (ǫ)2 ·∆xt(A),h (ω) ·D2ux˜,τ ·ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω) ·∆xt(A),h (ω)
]}
P π
(
dω|ωt(A))
=
{∫
A
ux˜,A,h1 (ω)P
π
(
dω|ωt(A))}·ǫ·{∫
A
ux˜,A,h2 (ω)∫
A
ux˜,A,h1 (ω
′)P π (dω′|ωt(A))∆x2,t(A)+1,h (ω)P
π
(
dω|ωt(A))
+∆x1,t(A),h (ω) + ǫ ·
∫
A
1
2
∆xt(A),h (ω) ·D2ux˜,τ ·ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω) ·∆xt(A),h (ω)∫
A
ux˜,A,h1 (ω
′)P π (dω′|ωt(A)) P
π
(
dω|ωt(A))} (∗)
where we use the fact that u is strictly increasing and differentiable.
Bounds on derivatives can now be defined (‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm in R2):
Dx˜1 (ω) := inf(A,h)∈A×H u
x˜,A,h
1 (ω) , D
x˜
1 (ω) := sup(A,h)∈A×H u
x˜,A,h
1 (ω) ,
Dx˜2 (ω) := inf(A,h)∈A×Hminǫ∈[0,1]min{x∈R2|‖x‖=1} (−1)x ·D2ux˜,ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω) · x,
D
x˜
2 (ω) := sup(A,h)∈A×Hmaxǫ∈[0,1]max{x∈R2|‖x‖=1} (−1)x ·D2ux˜,ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω) · x.
Given ω, Dx˜1 (ω) and D
x˜
1 (ω) provide lower and upper bounds for u
x˜,A,h
1 (ω) that are
uniform across agents (note that the initial old agents have no role here); similarly,
Dx˜2 (ω) · ‖ ∆xt(A),h (ω) ‖2 and Dx˜2 (ω) · ‖ ∆xt(A),h (ω) ‖2 provide bounds for
(−1)∆xt(A),h (ω) ·D2ux˜,ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω) ·∆xt(A),h (ω) .
We make two independent curvature assumptions which require the existence of certain
uniform bounds. These are not implied by Assumption 2 as no continuity assumptions
were made regarding the influence of ω on the economy.
Assumption C (ii): ρx˜ := 1
2
infω∈ΩD
x˜
2(ω)
supω∈ΩD
x˜
1(ω)
> 0, C (iii): ρx˜ := 1
2
supω∈ΩD
x˜
2(ω)
infω∈ΩD
x˜
1(ω)
<∞.
Remark C: If we consider an allocation that is uniformly interior as per Definition 8, and
recall that by Assumption 3 the aggregate endowment is uniformly bounded, we can be
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certain that all consumption vectors lie in a compact subset of R2++; also, since (iii) (b) in
Assumption 2 imposes twice continuous differentiability of the Bernoulli utility function
of each agent, the first and second derivatives are uniformly bounded on compact subsets
of R2++. It follows that if the Bernoulli function is independent of the state when young
and when old then, under Assumptions 2-3, and the requirement that the allocation under
consideration is uniformly interior, Assumptions C (ii) and C (iii) necessarily hold.
Note that
[
∆x1,t(A),h (ω)
]2 ≤‖ ∆xt(A),h (ω) ‖2 and ∆x1,t(A),h (ω) is Ft(A)-measurable.
Therefore, from the definitions, we have
ρx˜
[
∆x1,t(A),h (ω)
]2
=
1
2
infω∈ΩD
x˜
2 (ω)
supω∈ΩD
x˜
1 (ω)
[
∆x1,t(A),h (ω)
]2
≤ −
∫
A
1
2
∆xt(A),h (ω) ·D2ux˜,ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω) ·∆xt(A),h (ω)∫
A
ux˜,A,h1 (ω
′)P π (dω′|ωt(A)) P
π
(
dω|ωt(A))
≤ 1
2
supω∈ΩD
x˜
2 (ω)
infω∈ΩD
x˜
1 (ω)
∫
A
‖ ∆xt(A),h (ω) ‖2 P π
(
dω|ωt(A))
= ρx˜
∫
A
‖ ∆xt(A),h (ω) ‖2 P π
(
dω|ωt(A)) . (∗∗)
With the preliminaries in place, we can move on to the results.
Observe that Assumption 3 and uniform interiority of the equilibrium allocation imply
that Assumption C (i) holds.
Lemma C (i): Under A.1-4 and A.C (i) and (ii), if xˆ(A, h) ∈ XeA,h and∫
A
ux˜,A,h2 (ω)∫
A
ux˜,A,h1 (ω
′)P π (dω′|ωt(A))∆x2,t(A)+1,h (ω)P
π
(
dω|ωt(A))+∆x1,t(A),h (ω) ≥ δ > 0,
then there exists an ǫ > 0 such that
V (x˜ (A, h) + ǫ ·∆x(A, h);A, h) > V (x˜ (A, h) ;A, h) .
Proof: A.3 implies that ‖ ∆xt(A),h (ω) ‖≤
√
2e uniformly. So the last term in (∗∗) is
bounded above by ρx˜ · 2 (e)2.
We can combine (∗) with the second inequality in (∗∗) to conclude that∫
A
[
ux˜,ǫ,∆x,A,h (ω)− ux˜,A,h (ω)]P π (dω|ωt(A))
≥
{∫
A
ux˜,A,h1 (ω)P
π
(
dω|ωt(A))} · ǫ · {δ − ǫ · ρx˜ · 2 (e)2} .
The first term on the right is positive since u is strictly increasing and differentiable.
Hence, by choosing ǫ > 0 to be sufficiently small, it is possible to ensure that the last
term is positive thus completing the proof.
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Lemma C (ii): Under A.1-4 and A.C (i) and (iii), if xˆ(A, h) ∈ XeA,h and
V (xˆ (A, h) ;A, h) ≥ V (x˜ (A, h) ;A, h) ,
then∫
A
ux˜,A,h2 (ω)∫
A
ux˜,A,h1 (ω
′)P π (dω′|ωt(A))∆x2,t(A)+1,h (ω)P
π
(
dω|ωt(A))+∆x1,t(A),h (ω)−ρx˜ [∆x1,t(A),h (ω)]2 ≥ 0.
Proof: Under the stated hypothesis, for ω ∈ A, we have∫
A
[
ux˜,1,∆x,A,h (ω)− ux˜,A,h (ω)]P π (dω|ωt(A)) ≥ 0.
By combining (∗) with the first inequality in (∗∗), and using the fact that u is strictly
increasing and differentiable, we can conclude that the required inequality holds.
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